

00581

1981/06/15

15 JUN 81Z 16 29

004739

Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

3-7
Bl
1-13/16

NOBIS REVIEW

- (Cat. A) - Caption removed:
transferred to IM/IS/FPC
Cat. B - Transferred to IM/IS/FPC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Eljah Kelly, Jr.

Date: 5/16/95

SECRET 400500

PAGE 01 SFC TO 24050 01 OF 09 191439Z
ACTION 0004-00

INFO OCT-01 AOS-00 1001

0 151400Z JUN 81 ZFF-4
FM US07U SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5431

S F C T SECTION 01 OF 09 SFC TO 24050

UNCLAS E.O. 12958: R05-3 6/15/01 (SETT7, R.G. M.)
TARS: DUTY (HAIR, ALEXANDER M.), FM
SECRETARY SECRETARY HAIR'S JUNE 14, 1981 RITALEGAL WITH HUANG MIA

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY HAIR'S FIRSTNAME)-S3RAL
WITH CHINESE VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG MIA
WAS DEVOTED TO AN EXPLANATION OF THE PEACEMAN ADMINISTRATION'S
APPROACH TO GLOBAL STRATEGY. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED
THIS POLICY AS BASED ON FOUR "PILLARS": (1) THE RECOGNITION
OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GLOBAL DOMINATION AS THE
PRINCIPAL THREAT TO WORLD PEACE; (2) REJUVENATION OF THE
TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND FRIENDSHIPS OF THE US TO
COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT; (3) US EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH
JUST AND RESPONSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEVELOPING
WORLD; (4) REINVIGORATION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.

3. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF BINO-
AMERICAN COOPERATION TO THESE ENDS. HE NOTED SOVIET
DISTRESS AT THE PERPETUATING OF US MILITARY POWER, SOVIET
EFFORTS TO DIVIDE COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO THEM, AND THE
FAILURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AS THE MAJOR CHALLENGES
WE FACE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM HUANG, THE
SECRETARY DESCRIBED SOVIET EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE WESTERN
EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID THEIR MAJOR FOCUS WAS
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, WHERE THEY SOUGHT CONTROL OF

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NOBIS

NOBIS

NOBIS

NOBIS

NOBIS

EX-15 Date: 8/15/95

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 22

SECTO 74054 21 OF 20 151439Z

KEY STRATEGIC CHOKER POINTS AND RESOURCES, A PRINCIPAL
SOVIET PREOCCUPATION IN THIS REGION WAS SOUTHWEST ASIA.

4. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE US DEFENSE OUTLOOK
IN DETAIL. HUANG

5. HUANG

THE SECRETARY
PERCEIVED HIS SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS DURING HIS SINGLE
FAST VISIT AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. HE CONTINUED HIS
EFFORTS TO ELICIT SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION FORGEMINE
INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA.

6. THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG AGREED ON
THE ANXIOUS NATURE OF RECENT CHANGES IN SOVIET
POLICIES TOWARD POLAND, AND ON THE NEED FOR A FIRM AND
UNITED INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE. DETAILED DISCUSSION
OF AFGHANISTAN AND KAMBODJA WAS DEFERRED TO THEIR SECOND
MEETING.

7. PARTICIPATING IN THIS MEETING FOR THE US WERE THE
SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCJORDGE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
GALT, DEPUTY GENERAL WALTERS, DE DIRECTOR RUOT, WERSOS,
ARMARONT, MILLEY, ARMITAGE, POLLOCK AND FREEMAN
INTERPRETERS, AND MR. CHANG, INTERPRETER, FOR THE
CHINESE SIDE. VICE PREMIER HUANG, VICE MINISTER ZHANG,
AMBASSADOR CHAT, DIRECTOR HAN YU, WERSOS, LI CHANZHU,
TANG LONGSHU, ZHANG WENPU, AND YU (INTERPRETER), AND
SIX INTERPRETERS, FOR SUMMARY.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

15 JUN 1981 20

004740

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 400548

PAGE 01 SFC TO 74958 22 OF 60 151434Z
ACTION 4005-00

INFO OCT-71 AOS-08 /441 6

0 151400Z JUN 81 ZFF-4
FM USCEL SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5432

S E C R E T SECTION 72 OF 59 SFC TO 74958

NOBIS

8. HUANG WUA WELCOMED THE SECRETARY AND HIS PARTY TO
THE YINJIANG ROOM AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE AT
4:30 P.M. JUNE 14, 1981.

9. HUANG OPENED THE MEETING BY WARMLY WELCOMING THE
SECRETARY AND HIS PARTY ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE GOVERN-
MENT. HE THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HAVING ACCEPTED
CHINA'S INVITATION TO VISIT BEIJING. HUANG NOTED THAT
THE SECRETARY HAD LAST VISITED BEIJING 9-1/2 YEARS
AGO. HE HAD BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH THE LATE PREMIER
ZHOU ENLAI. THE CHINESE CONSIDERED THE SECRETARY AN
OLD FRIEND. HUANG NOTED HE WAS VISITING CHINA IN A
PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND TURBULENCE. THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED HIS VISIT OF MAJOR
SIGNIFICANCE AND VERY USEFUL. ALTHOUGH THE VISIT WAS
SHORT, HUANG SAID, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HOPED IT
WOULD BE FRUITFUL.

10. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE ENJOYED RETURNING
TO BEIJING, WHICH WAS A PLACE FOR WHICH HE HAD GREAT
RESPECT AND AFFECTION. HE NOTED THE PRESENCE OF MANY
OLD FRIENDS ACROSS THE TABLE, ADDING THAT THIS RETURN
TO BEIJING HAD BEEN TOO LONG DELAYED. THE SECRETARY
SAID THAT THE CHINESE WERE AWARE THAT ON THE U.S.
SIDE OF THE TABLE WERE MANY MEN WHO HAD WORKED FOR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 SFCIO 34958 02 OF 02 151436Z

GOOD U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS OVER A PERIOD OF AS MUCH AS 14 YEARS. THE SIGNIFICANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS VISIT COULD BE SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT OUR INTERPRETER HAD BEEN WANTED ONLY THREE DAYS BEFORE THE TRIP.

11. HUANG HUA AND HIS COLLEAGUES CONGRATULATED MR. CHANG ON HER WEDDING.

12. THE SECRETARY THEN LAUGHED WHEN HE SAID THAT HE Doubted THAT MR. CHANG WOULD ENJOY HER VISIT TO PEKING AS MUCH AS SHE MIGHT HAVE ENJOYED HER HOMEWORK. THE SECRETARY THEN INTRODUCED THE MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY, NOTING IN EACH CASE THE ROLE THEY HAD PLAYED OR COULD PLAY IN THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. HE CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY EXPRESSING HIS PLEASURE AT THE NOMINATION OF AMBASSADOR HUMMEL AS US AMBASSADOR TO CHINA. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR HUMMEL HAD SERVED COMMERCE IN PAKISTAN DURING A PERIOD WHEN U.S. POLICIES WERE SOMETIMES CONFUSED AND LESS THAN EFFECTIVE. IN THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD AMBASSADOR HUMMEL WAS ALWAYS A VOICE FOR TRUTH AND COURAGE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT HIS CONFIRMATION COULD BE CONCLUDED IN LATE JULY AND THAT HE MIGHT BE IN PEKING BY THE END OF JULY OR EARLY AUGUST. DEFERRING AGAIN TO HIS PARTY, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS, WHICH HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE PRESENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AS WELL AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT, DEMONSTRATED AN AMERICAN CONSENSUS ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS. THIS WAS IMPERATIVE NOT ONLY AS GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS BUT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED

15 JUL 1981 29

004741

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 400506

PAGE 01 SFC TO 14058 13 OF 20 151449Z
ACTION 4005-02

INFO OCT-01 175-00 /001 2

-----004645 1514117 /41
N 1514407 104 01 ZFF-4
FM USCEL SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5433

S F C O F T SECTION 23 OF 29 SFC TO 14058

NOTE:

15. THE SECRETARY BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY NOTING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES IS THAT BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE LONG OVERDUE DISMISAL OF THE POST-VIETNAM, POST-WATERGATE SYNDROME, WHICH HAD DOMINATED U.S. POLICY THROUGH THE FORD AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD BEEN ELECTED ON A PLATFORM DEDICATED TO THE REINVIGORATION OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD. THIS REINVIGORATION RESTED ON FOUR BASIC "PILLARS."

16. THE FIRST "PILLAR" WAS STRUCTURED ON THE CONVICTION OF THE PRESIDENT -- HELD STRONGLY IN EARLIER TIMES AND HELD BY HIM STRONGLY TODAY -- THAT THE GREATEST THREATS TO WORLD PEACE ARE THE SEARCH FOR HEGEMONY BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GROWING DANGER ARISING FROM THE SOVIET'S IMMENSE ACCUMULATION OF MILITARY POWER. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO INSIST ON INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ON RECIPROCITY IN OUR OWN DEALINGS WITH SOVIETS. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR STRENGTHENING OF AMERICAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS, HE SAID, IN A FEW MOMENTS.

17. THE SECOND "PILLAR" OF PRESIDENT
SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NON-SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 11 SECTO 74258 42 OF 49 191434Z

A VITAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DISBURAL. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO OUTLINE THE NEW APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD INITIATED. AFTER A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE GLOBE HE COULD TURN TO SPECIFIC REGIONS, WORKING TOGETHER TO AVOID HIS HAVING TO DELIVER A MONOLOGUE.

14. HUANG ENDORSED THIS ARRANGEMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE A BRIFFING ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY AN EXPLANATION OF HOW THE U.S. VIEWED THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION FROM A STRATEGIC STANDPOINT AND HOW U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS MIGHT FIT INTO U.S. STRATEGY. HE PROMISED TO ASK QUESTIONS AND MAKE COMMENTS AND NOT LET THE SECRETARY ENGAGE IN A MONOLOGUE. HUANG THEN INTRODUCED HIS OWN PARTY TO THE SECRETARY.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 22

SECRET 74P58 AT OF JO 191402

DEAGAN'S POLICY WAS THE REINFORCEMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF BOTH OUR TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND OUR RELATIONS WITH FRIENDLY NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES CONCERNED WITH THE THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM.

18. THE THIRD "PILLAR" WAS, THE SECRETARY SAID, THE RECOGNITION THAT IN A CHANGING WORLD IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. ESTABLISH JUST AND RESPONSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD. WE SEEK TO FOSTER A CLEAR RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF MORE AND MORE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT ASSOCIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION LEADS ONLY TO DISAPPOINTMENT. IT BRINGS ARGUMENTS, BUT NOT GROWTH, NOT ECONOMIC BENEFITS, OR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OR MEDICAL PROGRESS. THE DEAGAN ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PURSUE POLICIES TO COUNTER THE SPECTRE OF IMPERIALISM AND HEGEMONISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RAISED. OUR POLICY WOULD BE BASED ON THE RECOGNITION THAT "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT" WAS AN IMPORTANT TERM, AND THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH TRULY NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN A SENSITIVE AND ENLIGHTENED WAY. THE SECRETARY NOTED, HOWEVER, THE DIFFICULTY OF "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT," QUOTING PRESIDENT JIA OF PAKISTAN AS HAVING SAID THAT THERE ARE "ONLY TWO TRUE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS IN THE WORLD," THE U.S. AND THE USSR.

19. FINALLY, THE FOURTH "PILLAR" OF OUR POLICY, THE SECRETARY SAID, WAS THE RECOGNITION THAT WE CANNOT REINFORCE OUR POLICIES AND RELATIONSHIPS AROUND WITHOUT STRAIGHTENING OUT OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 01 SECTO 24754 PT OF 20 151440Z

20 IN APPROACHING THE QUESTION OF CHINA'S ROLE IN THIS REGARD, THE SECRETARY SAID, HE WOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL BELIEF OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMINISTRATION THAT THE US-CHINA REOCCUPANCY OF THE 1970'S WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC EVENT OF THAT DECADE, AS GREAT AS ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND DEEN IN THE 1970'S, HOWEVER, IN THE 1980'S -- AN INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS DECADE -- STRONG U.S. CHINA RELATIONS TOOK ON EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVED THAT ONLY THROUGH MORE EFFECTIVE CONCERTING AND COORDINATION OF POLICIES BETWEEN BEIJING AND WASHINGTON COULD WE HOPE TO COPE WITH THE INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH SEEKS WORLDWIDE DOMINATION.

21. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WHEN HE HAD HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, MR. GORBATOV, HE HAD DRAWN THREE IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, THE SOVIET UNION TODAY IS MOST DISTURBED BY THE PROSPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES AT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

18762
**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET 400508

PAGE 01 SFC TO 74758 24 OF 29 151411Z
ACTION 400508

INFO OCT-01 AOS-02 1001

-----00070 1516147 41
7 1514007 104 01 ZFF-4
FM USUFL SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5034

SECRET SECTION 04 OF 29 SFC TO 74758

NUM 14

LONG LAST IS DEDICATED TO REBUILDING IN MILITARY
STRENGTH. SOVIET POLICIES WILL THEREFORE SEEK TO
REVERSE THIS NEW AMERICAN RESOLVE. TO ACHIEVE THIS
OBJECTIVE, THEY WILL USE A VARIETY OF MEANS -- IN-
CLUDING ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES AND PEACE OFFENSIVES --
DESIGNED TO BREAK UP THE UNUSUAL HISTORICAL CONSENSUS
WHICH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE CONGRESS, AND THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAD ACHIEVED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
20 YEARS. THE UNANIMOUS AMERICAN VIEW WAS THAT IT
WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO REBUILD ITS
MILITARY STRENGTH.

22. THE SECOND CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION
INTENDED TO DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO BREAK
UP ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THOSE WHO WOULD
COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. AGAINST SOVIET IMPERIALISM.
IN EUROPE THEY INTENDED TO POSE AS ADVOCATES OF
PEACE AND DISARMAMENT; ELSEWHERE THEY WOULD PURSUE
ANY TACTIC THEY COULD. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT
TASS HAD, ON THE VERY DAY OF HIS ARRIVAL IN BEIJING
ATTACKED HIS VISIT TO CHINA IN WHAT HE SARCASTICALLY
TERMED "VERY SUBTLE TERMS."

23. A THIRD CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS
RECOGNIZED THE FUNDAMENTAL FAILURE OF THEIR

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NO-1-S

NO-1-S

NO-1-S

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

PAGE 02 SFCTL 04050 24 OF 40 191011Z

SYSTEM OF MARXISM/LENINISM AND THE SOVIET MODEL. IN ARCHITECTURE AND THE ECONOMY, IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IN THE AREA OF DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS AMONG THE NON-SOVIET POPULATIONS AND CENTRIFUGAL PRESSURES IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE, SUCH AS THOSE OF GERMANY IN POLAND, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE HAD TO SEE THEMSELVES AS OPERATING UNDER A DEADLINE. IN OUR VIEW THESE CHANGES MADE THE SOVIETS MORE, NOT LESS, DANGEROUS. POSSESSING AT PRESENT WITH UNPRECEDENTED MILITARY STRENGTH, THEY WILL BE TEMPTED TO TAKE RISKS ABROAD IN ORDER TO DIVERT INTERNAL ATTENTION FROM THEIR FAILURES.

24: THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THEN DEAGAN ADMITS-
TRAITOR HAD CONCLUDED THAT FOR THESE REASONS THE CO-
VENIENCE OF CHINESE AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE
STRATEGIC SENSE HAD TAKEN ON UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE
IN THE PASTORAL AREA.

25. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD BE DEFENDING TO
TALK ABOUT U.S. PLANS TO STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY
DEFENSES IF THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED.

20. HUANG SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS.

B143

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

१६८५६ ?

PAGE 43

SECRET 14-00000 14-00000 14-00000 14-00000

B, 42

DECLASSIFIED

९६ अक्षर

DECLASSIFIED

15 JUL 1976 23

004743

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET 400691

PAGE 11 SECTO 44958 AS OF 10 191422Z
ACTION 400691

THEU OCT-71 AOS-49 1401 4

151400Z 100 01 ZFF-4 -----PR4042 151427Z 141

FM URUGL SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO DECEASE HARMONIC IMMEDIATE 5434

SECRET SECTION 05 OF 79 SECTO 44958

40019

29. THE SECRETARY SAID, FIRST OF ALL, WITH
RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE USSR HAD A
GLOBAL STRATEGY, THE EXPERIENCE OF THE POST-WWII
PERIOD CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE IN SEARCH OF
GLOBAL HEGEMONY. THIS SEARCH HAD IDEOLOGICAL OVER-
TONES, BUT IN PRACTICE THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO
USE THEIR INFLUENCE AND TO SEEK ANY TARGET OF OPPOR-
TUNITY TO EXPAND THEIR PRESENCE IN THE WORLD. WE
HAD SEEN THIS IN A HOST OF INSTANCES. IN EUROPE
THE SOVIETS SEEK TO NEUTRALIZE OR FINLANDIZE THE
COUNTRIES OF THE AREA. IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD THE
SOVIETS ACTED THROUGH PROXIES AND ATTEMPTED TO EST-
ABLISH CLIENT-STATE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES. THEY FOUND MANY WHO WERE WILLING TO
TAKE WEAPONS FROM THEM. IN THE WORLD AT LARGE THE
SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO SPLIT ALL WHO MIGHT ATTEMPT TO
STAND TOGETHER AGAINST THEM. THE QUESTION
STRATEGY, THEREFORE, WAS TO FRAGMENT AND NEUTRALIZE
WESTERN EUROPE, AND PROOF ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.
BUT THEY SAW THEIR GREATEST OPPORTUNITY PERHAPS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD. THEY PURSUED THIS INTEREST NOT ONLY
IN TERMS OF EXPANDED INFLUENCE BUT ALSO THROUGH
EFFORTS TO SEIZE KEY STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS FROM
WHICH THEY COULD CONTROL COMMERCE, ENERGY SUPPLIES OR
THE FLOW OF RAW MATERIALS. IN THIS WAY THEY HOPED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NON-SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 SECTO 14758 25 OF 20 151422Z

THEY COULD STRANGLE THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WITHOUT HAVING TO OPENLY FIGHT THEM.

30. THEIR KEY STRATEGY -- WHICH THEY HAD USED WITH SOME SUCCESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD -- WAS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF LOCAL INJUSTICE AND THROTTLE THROUGH SUBVERSION, TERRORISM, AND INFILTRATION. THEY SOUGHT IN THIS WAY TO CREATE A CORRELATION OF FORCES WHICH WOULD FURTHER SOVIET INTERVENTION EITHER BY THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS, BY THE INTRODUCTION OF PROXY FORCES OR EVEN AS IN AFGHANISTAN -- BY THE DIRECT USE OF SOVIET FORCES THEMSELVES. HE HAD SEEN THIS PATTERN, THE SECRETARY SAID, IN ANGOLA, IN ETHIOPIA, IN SOUTH YEMEN, IN NORTH YEMEN, IN AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, AND EL SALVADOR. IN EL SALVADOR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS HOPED TO REACH INTO HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA -- OR EVEN PANAMA OR MEXICO IF THEIR ACTIVITIES WERE LEFT UNATTENDED.

31. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT AMONG THE MOST URGENT TASKS HE FACE WHICH HE HAD NOT PERFORMED WELL AT ALL TIMES IN THE PAST WAS TO DEAL WITH DEVELOPING STATES IN A WAY THAT HELPED THEM RECOGNIZE THE REALITIES OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT AND ASSOCIATION WITH THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED STATES, FROM WHOM THEY COULD ENJOY A MORE ORGANIC CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT THAN COULD BE MADE BY THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS WAS THE APPROACH THE UNITED STATES WAS TAKING IN AFRICA, WHERE HE MADE THE HIGHEST AID CONTRIBUTION TO ZIMBABWE, AND A GENEROUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE RECENT AFRICAN PEACE CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. HE WERE WORKING TO ACHIEVE GENUINE INDEPENDENCE, INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND STABILITY FOR NAMIBIA UNDER TERMS WHICH WOULD NOT MAKE IT A SOVIET-MARXIST/LENINIST

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 17 SECTO 74758 AS OF HQ 151422Z

PARITY. THIS WAS ALSO THE APPROACH IN CENTRAL
AMERICA. OUR EFFORTS THERE WERE NOT EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY BUT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NOON-1S
NOON-1S
NOON-1S

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET 400597

PAGE 01 SFCTO 24951 NR OF NO 1514292
ACTION 4009-70

INFO OCT-01 403-00 /001

-----000013 1515332 /40
O 1514007 JUM #1 ZFF-4
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5434

SECRET SECTION 4 OF 9 SFCTO 44058

40019

BUTHER DEPENDS UPON THE ELABORATION OF A NEW REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PLAN COORDINATE WITH NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
IN THE REGION AND BENEFITTING FROM CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
THE WEST EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE.

32. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTY
OF ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES, GIVEN HISTORIC MISTAKES
NOT ONLY BY THE UNITED STATES BUT BY THE WESTERN
INDUSTRIAL POWERS AS A WHOLE. THESE OBJECTIVES MUST
BE PURSUED, HE SAID, WITH GREAT SINCERITY AND PERSEVER-
ENCE. HE MUST, HOWEVER, BE COGNIZANT THAT
OUR OBJECTIVES COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED EXCLUSIVELY BY
"NATION-BUILDING" APPROACHES. HE MUST RECOGNIZE THE
SOURCES OF UNREST AND TURMOIL IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
AND TAKE ACTIONS WHICH REACH DIRECTLY TO THE SOURCES OF
UCH TURMOIL. IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE HE WERE
CONCERNED ABOUT CUBA AS SUCH A SOURCE. IN NORTH AFRICA
HE WERE CONCERNED ABT LIBYA. BUT IN A GLOBAL SENSE
IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MAJOR SOURCE OF SUCH DIFFICULTY
WAS THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF.

33. BEING ASKED IF THE SECRETARY WOULD CARE TO DESCRIBE
HIS VIEW OF THE FOCUS OF SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY, THAT
IS, ON WHICH AREAS DID THE SOVIET UNION CONCENTRATE ITS
EFFORTS?

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 12

SFCTD 14038 08 OF 20 151529Z

14. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE WAS STRATEGIC PRESURE BY THE SOVIETS ON MANY FRONTS. WHERE THEY HAVE ENCOUNTERED STRONG OPPOSITION THEY WOULD SHIFT TO WHERE THEY ENCOUNTERED SOFTNESS OR WHERE FORWARD PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE. THEY SOUGHT TO NEUTRALIZE WESTERN EUROPE THROUGH PEACE OFFENSIVES AND BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE NATURAL APPETITE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. IN THE THIRD WORLD THEY ALSO ATTEMPTED TO MOVE ON A BROAD FRONT. THEY WERE CONCENTRATING ON ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION AND STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS SO NEAR THAT CONTAINED MAJOR ENERGY AND RAW MATERIAL SUPPLIES. IN THE REGION, THEIR EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, NORTHERN AFRICA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA WERE IMPORTANT. THEY CLEARLY REGARDED IT AS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO CONTROL THE SEA LINES CONNECTING THE INDIAN AND PACIFIC OCEANS. THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND OTHER LINES OF COMMUNICATION ACROSS THE WORLD. IT WAS IN THIS CONNECTION THAT HE HAD TO VIEW THEIR RULING IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM. THEY HAD CONSTRUCTED NEW INTELLIGENCE BASES THERE, SECOND IN SIZE ONLY TO THEIR FACILITY IN CHINA.

15. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR JONBROWNE, THE SECRETARY NOTED, HE HAD PERCEIVED A RUSSIAN PREOCCUPATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA, I.E., THE REGION FROM AFGHANISTAN THROUGH IRAN TO THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS WAS CLEARLY A TARGET OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ONE MUST NEVER ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN ONLY TO ESTABLISH A SAFETY BUFFER. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEIR INVASION MUST BE VIEWED AS PREDICATED ON HEGEMONISTIC DESIGNS ON KEY ENERGY-PRODUCING AREAS OF THE WORLD.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02

SECRET 04050 24 OF 10 151529Z

AND ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES THROUGH WHICH ENERGY IS TRANSPORTED. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT, IF IT WERE OF INTEREST TO THE CHINESE, OUR EXPERTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD SIDE TALKS WITH THE CHINESE MILITARY ON ASPECTS OF OUR OWN MILITARY PLANNING AND TO PROVIDE UPDATED ASSESSMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY. GENERAL MAITERS MIGHT PROVIDE THE LATTER.

MR. ROBT AND HIS COLLEAGUES COULD DISCUSS THE FORMER. WANG RESPONDED THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS COULD AND WOULD BE MADE.

36. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT DESPITE HIS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, WHICH HE SHARED WITH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ALIKE, THIS YEAR HE WAS ADDING 32 BILLION DOLLARS TO THE ORIGINAL CARTER DEFENSE BUDGET. OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS HE WOULD ADD 200 BILLION DOLLARS OVER WHAT CARTER HAD PLANNED. THESE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES WOULD GO TO IMPROVING OUR CENTRAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POWER AND ALSO, MORE IMPORTANTLY OUR NAVAL AND GROUND FORCES.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

5010 200 000
DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

196745

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET 400546

PAGE 21 SFCYD 24758 27 OF 30 151511Z
ACTION 400546

INFO OCT-01 ANS-44 /401 2

-----004544 151510Z /40

0 151430Z JUN 81 ZFF-4

FM UNDER SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5437

SECRET SECTION 7 OF 9 SFCYD 24758

MURIN

37. IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WE
INTENDED TO BUILD A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER AND PUT IT
INTO PRODUCTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD ADD
3,000 LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES AS WELL AS NEW LAND-
BASED STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS. WE WERE DEVELOPING
OUR NEXT MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINE AND NOVA MISSILE
TO THE UK. WE INTENDED TO ENHANCE OUR THEATED NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CAPABILITIES AS WELL.

38. IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND
FORCES, WE WERE BUILDING A NEW TANK AND ARMED FIGHTING
VEHICLES WHICH WE WOULD PRODUCE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.
WE WOULD INTRODUCE A NEW ROCKET LAUNCHER AND ASSAULT
HELICOPTER, AS WELL AS THREE NEW ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES.
WE PLANNED TO STEP UP PRODUCTION FOR FIVE NEW FIGHTER-
BOMBER TYPES. WE WERE WORKING TO IMPROVE POSITIONING
OF WAR RESERVE MATERIAL TO ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO REACT
QUICKLY, IF NECESSARY, IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN
THEATERS.

39. PERHAPS OUR MOST SUBSTANTIAL BUILD-UP WOULD BE IN
NAVAL POWER. WE WOULD ADD 150 SHIPS TO THE 450 NOW IN
OUR INVENTORY, BRINGING THE NAVY TO 600 SHIPS. WE WOULD
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CARRIER TASK GROUPS FROM 12
TO 17, WHILE ADDING MANY CRUISE MISSILES TO OUR FLEET.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NO-1-S

NO-1-S

NO-1-S

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 22 SECTO 24050 27 OF 40 151511Z

INCLUDING THOSE ON TWO REEQUIPPED BATTLESHIPS, ADDING
SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR NAVY'S LONG RANGE AND FLEX SUPPORT
CAPABILITIES.

40. HUANG SAID

B/127

42. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED AT THE
EXAMPLES CITED BY THE VICE PREMIER, ADDING THAT HE WAS
ONLY SURPRISED THAT HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE LIFTING
OF THE US GRAIN EMBARGO AGAINST THE USSR. (THIS CAME
FROM APPRECIATIVE LAUGHTER FROM THE CHINESE.) HE
SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS THE
MOST DANGEROUS AREA IN THE WORLD AT PRESENT. HE WISHED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 SECTO 74050 17 OF 20 191911Z

TO SAY A WORD ABOUT WHAT WE WERE ACTUALLY DOING IN THE REGION, AS OPPOSED TO WHAT WE ARE PERCEIVED TO BE DOING.

43. OUR POLICY RESTS ON A RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE AREA, INCLUDING RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS TO MOVE INTO THE HIGHLY UNSTABLE SITUATION IN IRAQ, TO EXPLOIT THEIR ECOTHOID IN ADEN TO MOVE INTO NORTH YEMEN AND TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SAUDIS AND OMAN FOR A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. WE TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE NEW TREATY THEY HAD SIGNED WITH SYRIA, AND THE WAYS IN WHICH THEY EXPLOITED ARAB-ISRAELI DIFFERENCES. WE PAID ATTENTION TO THEIR SUPPORT FOR LIBYA, AND THEIR EFFORT TO ESTABLISH WHAT EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT TERMED "BELTS" OF CONTROL FROM NORTH AFRICA ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST.

44. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HIS FIRST TRIP ABROAD HAD BEEN TO DEAL WITH THE CONTRADICTIONS WHICH HAD ARISEN. HE HAD TWO OBJECTIVES: (1) CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR AN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT; AND (2) STRENGTHEN ATTITUDES WITH RESPECT TO THE DANGERS FROM THE SOVIETS AMONG THE ARAB STATES.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NOV-15-1981

15 JUN 81 16 29

004746

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

Department of State
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 400503

PAGE 01 SFC TO 74058 08 OF 00 151558Z
ACTION 4005-73

INFO OCT-81 405-27 /201 W

-----RM5478 151600Z /01
O 151400Z JUN 81 ZFXI AD
FM UNDER SECRETARY IN RETJING
TO SECRETARY WAR PC IMMEDIATE 5838

SECRET SECTION 8 OF 9 SFC TO 44198

MURK

45. NEWSPAPER REPORTS NOTWITHSTANDING, WE HAVE MADE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A WHOLE NEW
SET OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH SAUDI ARABIA. 503X 281) 43719
IN SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF SAUDI AID TO PAKISTAN, SUDAN
AND ROMANIA, AS WELL AS SAUDI ASSISTANCE IN EFFORTS TO
COMBAT THE LITHUAN INVASION OF CHAD. WE HAVE REVERSED THE
ISOLATED ATTITUDE OF JORDAN. WE HAVE EVEN BEGUN A
TENTATIVE, EVOLUTIONARY IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS
WITH IRAQ. ALL THESE INITIATIVES AND STEPS HAVE BEEN
SET BACK BY THE ISRAELI BATO ON THE TRACT NUCLEAR FACIL-
ITIES. THE US HAS ISSUED AN UNPRECEDENTED CONDEMNATION OF
ISRAEL AND SUSPENDED THE SHIPMENT OF F-16'S TO IT.

46. OUR GREATEST DEGREE OF COORDINATION CONTINUES TO BE
WITH EGYPT. THE EGYPTIANS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH
US

ON THE PEACE PROCESS. THEY WILL COOPERATE STRATEGICALLY,
PROVIDING ALL THE MILITARY FACILITIES WE NEED TO WORK
AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF GHADAFI
AND HIS ACTIVITIES IN NORTH AFRICA.

47. WITH RESPECT TO NAMIBIA, THE PROBLEM WAS THAT WORKING
EXCLUSIVELY WITH UN RESOLUTION 435 WOULD ONLY RESULT IN
THE LONG-RUN, IN DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE SO-CALLED "FRONT LINE" STATES. HERE WE TO CONTINUE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED*Department of State***INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02

SECRET 7495R NR OF JO 151558Z

THE PORTUGAL ADMINISTRATION'S FAILED POLICIES, WE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CONFLICT BETWEEN BLACK AFRICANS AND SOUTHERN WHITE MINORITIES. THIS WOULD OFFER GREAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET INTERVENTIONISM.

48. HIS EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH PRESTIGE IN PORTUGAL ARE DESIGNED TO ELICIT FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE FLEXIBILITY THEY MUST EXERCISE TO GAIN GENUINE INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA. WE ALSO INTEND IN THIS CONNECTION TO

ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CURAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. WE WERE NOT MAKING NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE CONDITIONAL ON CURAN WITHDRAWAL, BUT WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT, IN THE FINAL STAGES, WE COULD BRING ABOUT SUCH WITHDRAWAL.

49. OUR BASIC APPROACH WAS CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 435, BUT MORE COMPREHENSIVE, INCLUDING MINIMAL GUARANTEES FOR MINORITIES, GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT, AND TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT FOR THE COUNTRY. THERE COULD BE NO PEACE WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION. ONLY THE US COULD OBTAIN SUCH COOPERATION. TO DO THIS IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE US UNDERSTANDS THEIR CONCERNS AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHERS.

50. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAD JUST LEFT ZIMBABWE. THERE WAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAD MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH LEADERS THERE.

51. HUANG NOTED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME, ONLY 20 MINUTES BEFORE THE SECRETARY HAD TO RETURN TO HIS GUEST HOUSE AND CHANGE FOR DINNER.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 SFC70 7495R 28 OF 40 191954Z

92. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED TO SPEAK BRIEFLY ABOUT POLAND. THE SITUATION THERE WAS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION WAS NOW STRONGER THAN IN THE RECENT PAST. THE STRUGGLE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN BETWEEN THE SOLIDARITY LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE POLISH PARTY. IT WAS NOW BETWEEN THE POLISH PARTY ITSELF AND THE RUSSIAN PARTY. THERE WOULD BE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE WEEKS AHEAD UNTIL THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS IN JULY. THE SECRETARY INVITED FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG TO COMMENT ON THE POLISH SITUATION.

93. HUANG SAID

B1A3

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

15 JUN 1979 29

004747

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

WJG

SECRET

409504

PAGE 01 SFC TO 24050 00 OF 00 191424Z
ACTION ANDERSON

INFO ACT-01 405-00 /H01 4

-----085527 151637 /41
O 151400Z JUN 81 ZFF-4
FM USOF SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY 40500 IMMEDIATE 5830

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 9 SFC TO 24050

40914

B1/43

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NON-SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 12

SECRET 24754 10 16 10 191420Z

B1
A3

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NON-SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 01

SECTO 74054 20 06 20 191430Z

B1 A3

57. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE AGREED COMPLETELY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THE AFGHAN AND KAMPUCHEAN SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT HE DO IN FACT HAVE UNUSUAL UNITY WITHIN NATO ON THE POLISH SITUATION. NOTING HUANG'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NAMIBIA, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD REALLY LIKE TO HAVE ANOTHER DAY IN WHICH TO DISCUSS THOSE ISSUES BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH. THE UNITED STATES NEEDED CHINESE HELP TO ENSURE A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THOSE QUESTIONS. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING MEETING BE DEVOTED TO A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE AFGHAN AND KAMPUCHEAN SITUATIONS.

58. HUANG SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE TO CONTINUE WITH THE DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ON JUNE 19 BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL MATTERS.

THE MEETING CONCLUDED AT 6:30 P.M.
MAYO

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED